Vancouver Attorney Angus Lee shares the legal and political consequences of the controversial decision by Clark County councilors to remove Councilor Michelle Belkot from C-TRAN Board of Directors

Angus Lee 
for Clark County Today

The Clark County Council’s recent vote to remove Councilor Michelle Belkot from the C-Tran Board appears to be without lawful authority. This decision not only sets a dangerous precedent but also exposes the Council — and C-TRAN—to a prolonged legal battle that could call into question every action the transit board takes for the remainder of the year.

If the C-TRAN Board refuses to recognize Councilor Belkot’s vote, on the basis of a removal that lacks legal foundation, any decisions made with the participation of her unlawfully appointed replacement could be rendered ultra vires — beyond the authority of the board — and subject to revocation by the courts. Such a scenario would create instability in C-TRAN’s governance, jeopardizing transportation policies.

Clark County Charter does not grant the council power to revoke appointments

At its core, this dispute is a question of authority. The Clark County Home Rule Charter functions as the county’s governing constitution, establishing the powers and limitations of its elected officials. Section 2.2(D) grants the County Council the power to appoint its members to external boards and commissions. However, nowhere in the Charter is the Council granted the power to revoke those appointments at will. The Charter is clear: the Council’s role is to appoint, not to remove.

Legal interpretation adheres to the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius—the expression of one thing excludes the other. If the Charter’s drafters intended to provide the Council with the power to remove its own appointees from external boards, they would have explicitly stated so. The fact that they did not is legally significant. Courts generally do not infer the existence of a removal power unless it is expressly granted in a governing document.

The council’s vote lacks historical and legal precedent

Section 2.2(D) of the Charter states, “The council shall vote to appoint its members to boards and commissions.” The language is clear: the Council has the power to appoint. However, it does not grant the Council the authority to remove a member prior to the expiration of their appointment.

No historical precedent exists in Clark County for such a midterm revocation. Traditionally, council appointments to external boards have been viewed as annual designations, intended to provide stability and continuity in governance. If the Council could simply revoke appointments mid-term based on disagreement with a board member’s decisions, the entire purpose of having independent representation on external boards would be undermined.

Additionally, Section 2.4(G) of the Charter gives the Council the power to “confirm or reject appointments to various boards forwarded by the county manager.” This provision, however, applies exclusively to appointments made by the county manager, not to the Council’s own appointment of a fellow council member. Again, if the drafters of the Charter had intended to allow the Council to remove its own members from external boards, they would have explicitly granted such authority — just as they did for appointment confirmations under Section 2.4(G). The absence of a similar provision for Council-appointed members is further proof that no such removal power exists.

A dangerous precedent that undermines independent judgment

The ability of external board members to exercise independent judgment is essential for good governance. The role of a Council-appointed board member is to represent the county’s interests — not to serve as a mere extension of the County Council’s mood on any given day. If removal were permitted based on policy disagreements or voting behavior, it would create a chilling effect on board members, discouraging them from exercising independent thought for fear of political retaliation.

This is precisely why most governing documents — including the Clark County Charter—do not allow for mid-term removals of board appointees. To allow otherwise would turn these appointments into tools of political enforcement rather than positions of governance.

Legal and political consequences

The Council would be wise to consult its legal advisors and ask a straightforward question: Where in the Charter is the authority to remove Belkot explicitly stated? The answer is simple: it is not. There is no provision granting such authority. Likewise, if they look to legal precedent, they will find no case law supporting their action.

And what happens if the C-TRAN Board disregards Belkot’s vote and allows an unlawfully appointed replacement to participate? The board will find itself embroiled in litigation, its decisions subject to judicial review, and potentially nullified. A long and costly legal battle awaits.

Perhaps the Council will reconsider its actions. If not, they should at least have the courage to admit that they are openly exceeding their lawful authority. The voters deserve to know whether their elected officials believe they are bound by the Charter — or whether they see themselves as above it.